Labor Law (reviewing \u3ci\u3eLabor Law: Cases, Materials and Problems\u3c/i\u3e by Bernard D. Meltzer, Stanley D. Henderson) by Vieira, Norman
LABOR LAW
Norman Vieirat
Labor Law: Cases, Materials and Problems (3d ed.). BERNARD D.
MELTZER & STANLEY D. HENDERSON. Little, Brown & Company, Bos-
ton, 1985. Pp. xxix, 1386. $34.00.
The third edition of Labor Law succeeds, not surprisingly, in
maintaining the high standard that Professor Meltzer set in the
two earlier editions of the book.1 Professor Meltzer and his new
collaborator, Professor Stanley Henderson, have retained the basic
organization of the previous volume and have taken essentially the
same approach to their material. The decision to preserve con-
tinuity while thoroughly updating the cases and notes was a wise
one, given the success that the book has deservedly enjoyed over
the past 15 years.
There can be little doubt that a new edition of the casebook is
timely. Eight years have passed since the previous edition was
published, and much has happened in the interim. The new vol-
ume duly reflects the various changes. Among the leading cases
which have been added are NLRB v. City Disposal Systems,2 Mid-
land National Life Insurance Co.,3 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v.
International Longshoremen's Association,4 NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union (Safeco Title Insurance Co.), 5 Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters,' and
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB.7
The coverage of Labor Law continues to be comprehensive
even though the sections on fair employment regulation and pub-
lic-sector labor relations have been eliminated. The material in
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1 For reviews of the two previous editions, see Stewart, Review, 38 U. CHL L. REv. 444
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chapters 4 through 11 will make up the core of most introductory
labor law courses, albeit with appropriate deletions for those who
cannot afford the luxury of assigning some 1150 pages. Those
chapters deal with the protection of the organizing process against
interference and discrimination, the selection of a bargaining rep-
resentative, the regulation of collective action, federal preemption,
collective bargaining, enforcement of collective agreements, and
problems concerning the individual and collective action.
What I find most impressive about this book, however, is not
the scope of its coverage-which, after all, is not substantially dif-
ferent from that of competing casebooks-but rather the depth of
its coverage. It is difficult to convey an accurate impression of the
book through a brief description of its general contents. For that
reason, I have selected a segment of the text which can, even
within the constraints of a book review, be examined in some de-
tail. The segment I have chosen deals with the regulation of cam-
paign techniques in representation elections. I choose this topic,
first, because its treatment has been substantially revised in the
new edition and, second, because it is heavily laden with first
amendment issues and other matters not uniquely related to tradi-
tional labor law concerns. If the editors deal thoroughly with these
issues, it should not be surprising that they are equally thorough in
addressing material which is at the core of their subject matter.
Meltzer and Henderson begin their treatment of the regula-
tion of campaign techniques with NLRB v. Golub Corp.,8 in which
the central conflict between the values of free speech and free
choice was sharply drawn in opinions by Judge Friendly and Judge
Hays. After noting the difficulty of reconciling those values in the
context of union representation elections, the editors set forth the
Labor Board's demand for "ideal" laboratory conditions in Gen-
eral Shoe Corp.' The reader's attention is specifically directed to
the question of whether such a demand can be squared with the
requirements of the first amendment. This, as the editors recog-
nize, is a far more difficult question than courts have generally as-
sumed. The tendency has been for federal courts to ignore the con-
stitutional problem10 or to equate misstatements in labor elections
8 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967).
9 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948), enforced sub nor. General Shoe Corp. v. NLRB, 192
F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
10 See, e.g., S.H. Kress & Co. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Bata
Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 917 (1967).
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with calculated falsehood,11 which is generally unprotected by the
first amendment. 12 But such misstatements are not necessarily cal-
culated, and labor-related speech is not readily distinguishable
from other electioneering, either in its predisposition to error or in
its importance to affected parties.
The Supreme Court's major effort to accommodate the de-
mands of free speech and free choice came in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co.,' 3 which Meltzer and Henderson include as a principal
case. Gissel, of course, relied on the economic dependence of em-
ployees and on the employer's special knowledge and control of the
employer-employee relationship. 4 But special knowledge of one's
subject has generally not been a sufficient answer to first amend-
ment claims even where, as in the case of pornography, the speech
is arguably at the periphery of first amendment concerns.15 And
while the economic dependence of employees provides a basis for
intervention in cases of coercive speech, Meltzer and Henderson
recognize that it provides far less justification for demanding labo-
ratory conditions in representation proceedings.
The tension between first amendment values and the labora-
tory conditions approach is well illustrated by the Board's rules on
inflammatory appeals to racial prejudice. Meltzer and Henderson
use NLRB v. Bancroft Manufacturing Co.'6 as a vehicle for consid-
eration of that issue. One might well prefer the Sewell case,'7
which is still the leading decision in this area, but enough is set
forth from the Sewell opinion to permit discussion of its first
amendment implications. The Sewell case, seeking to promote so-
ber and reasoned choice by employees, announced that racial ap-
peals in representation elections would trigger an order for a new
election unless the speaker limited himself "to truthfully setting
forth another party's position on matters of racial interest"'8 with-
out resorting to inflammatory utterances, and sustained the bur-
den of proving that the message was both truthful and germane.' 9
Meltzer and Henderson capture the central difficulty with the
See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873, 878 (2d Cir. 1971).
1 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
14 Id. at 620; see also infra note 21.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
516 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976).
11 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962), supp. opinion, 140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962).
18 138 N.L.R.B. at 71 (italics omitted).
10 Id. at 72.
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Sewell rules. Free speech, even though racial in nature, is not ordi-
narily limited to expression which the speaker can prove to be
truthful and germane. The point is quickly made by a note dis-
cussing Vanasco v. Schwartz,20 which invalidated government re-
strictions on race-oriented speech in the context of campaigns for
public office. Students are thus invited to confront the question
whether the Labor Board can justify departures from the stan-
dards governing political discourse when noncoercive speech is in-
volved.21 Meltzer and Henderson also focus attention on the
Board's distinction between temperate and inflammatory racial ap-
peals. Distinctions of this sort, as Derek Bok once remarked, make
"a strong appeal to decency. ' 22 But whether the Labor Board's
charge includes responsibility for assuring the decency of noncoer-
cive speech is questionable, and whether Congress would have the
power to issue such a charge is even more questionable. If the
Board's mission in representation proceedings is to protect em-
ployee free choice, the editors pose the right question when they
ask whether inflammatory appeals are more likely to affect voters
than temperate ones. 23 There is reason to believe that the opposite
is true. The Board's insistence on policing the relevancy of the de-
bate is even more disquieting. One of the hallmarks of a free elec-
tion is that the voters may decide for themselves what is relevant
and what is not. In its quest to reconcile values of free speech and
free choice, the Board has managed to undermine both.
Meltzer and Henderson give close attention to the treatment
of campaign misrepresentations. They trace the Board's uneasy
journey from Hollywood Ceramics24 to Midland Insurance,2 5 with
intermediate 180-degree turns in Shopping Kart2 6 and General
Knit. The discussion here does more than raise questions about
the role of stare decisis in administrative proceedings. Meltzer and
Henderson preface the Midland Insurance opinion with a detailed
20 401 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
21 The Gissel case suggested that union representation is distinguishable because it in-
volves a "nonpermanent, limited relationship between the employer, his economically de-
pendent employee and his union agent," but the speech in Gissel was found to be coercive.
395 U.S. at 617-19.
22 Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under The
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAnv. L. Rav. 38, 67 (1964).
23 See B. MELTZER & S. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 110
(3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as LABOR LAW].
24 Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
25 Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
24 Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
27 General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
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consideration of the study by Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, 8
which recommended a broad-scale deregulation of campaign com-
munications. The editors include a careful statement of the study's
major findings and note important questions that have been raised
about the desirability of deregulation.29 In addition, they cite nu-
merous commentaries on the Getman study and offer occasional
excerpts from the literature. A serious student will come away
from these materials with a much better understanding of the costs
and benefits of campaign regulation than the cases alone could
possibly provide.
After dealing with campaign misrepresentations, Meltzer and
Henderson turn to the interrogation of employees and the promise
or conferral of benefits. They begin with Teamsters, Local 633 v.
NLRB30 and conclude with the Supreme Court's decisions in Ex-
change Parts31 and Savair.32 Local 633 is a convenient vehicle for
consideration of both the Struksnes33 and Bourne34 approaches to
interrogation. It is also useful for its provocative suggestion that
"[t]here is always an iron 'fist inside the velvet glove' of [em-
ployer] persuasion.' ' 5 That suggestion may prompt students to
reevaluate the cases on employer free speech and to ponder the
problem posed by promises of benefit. Meltzer and Henderson il-
lustrate the latter problem in the notes following Exchange Parts,
but their evenhanded presentation also shows the dilemma that
employers may face in some cases. They ask, for example, what an
employer is permitted to say about employee complaints that
merit, but cannot be assured of, remedial action: "Must the com-
pany state that the law requires 'no promises' regarding employee
complaints? Indeed, would such a statement be lawful? '3 6
I have concentrated thus far on the regulation of campaign
techniques in representation elections. But Meltzer and Henderson
are equally attentive to important issues in other areas. I will offer
only one illustration, drawn from the section on regulation of sec-
ondary pressures by labor unions. Among a number of recent deci-
28 J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY (1976).
29 LABOR LAW, supra note 23, at 114-19.
30 509 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
S NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
32 NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
31 Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
34 Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
35 Teamsters, Local 633, 509 F.2d at 493 (quoting Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at 409)
(emphasis added).
36 LABOR LAW, supra note 23, at 144.
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sions added to that section is the Supreme Court's opinion in the
Safeco case,3 7 which upheld congressional power to regulate con-
sumer picketing at a secondary situs in order to protect neutral
parties from efforts to persuade customers to cease doing business
with them. Meltzer and Henderson pose challenging questions
about the basis for distinguishing "between an enterprise boycott
implemented by handbilling and one implemented by picketing"
or between successful primary and secondary activities that impose
identical losses on neutral parties.3 8 They also include a note on
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,3 9 which held that the first
amendment protects nonviolent secondary activity designed to in-
duce boycotted merchants to pressure the government into attack-
ing racial inequality. The Claiborne note, like the one dealing with
Vanasco v. Schwartz, is aimed at encouraging students to consider
the soundness of the distinction between communications involv-
ing political activity and communications involving labor activity.
The sensitive treatment which Meltzer and Henderson give to
issues somewhat removed from the core of traditional labor law
concerns is suggestive of the care that has attended the collection
and presentation of material throughout the book. This scholarly
care promises substantial dividends for those who use the
casebook. Of course, many factors will enter into a decision
whether to adopt a new book, including the considerable cost in-
volved in abandoning an old one which has already proved to be
serviceable. But beginning teachers can start on a sound footing by
adopting this casebook, and those who have used it in the past will
surely welcome the arrival of a new edition. Other labor law teach-
ers, though currently using a different book, might well wish to
consider the advantages of this one.
37 NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 447 U.S.
607 (1980).
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